The Economics of Judicial Behavior

The Economics of Judicial Behavior
 

Published in 2013 in Edward Elgar Publishing's series on Economic Approaches to Law, edited by Richard A. Posner & Francesco Parisi

Lee Epstein, editor

This book contains a selection of the best articles on judicial behavior. The list of articles follows.
My introduction is here (uncorrected page proofs).

The Judge: Motivations, Careers, & Performance

  1. Richard A. Posner (1993), 'What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)', Supreme Court Economic Review, 3, 1-41

  2. Christopher R. Drahozal (1998), 'Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process', SMU Law Review, 51, 469-503

  3. J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen (2001), 'Why Are Japanese Judges So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?', American Political Science Review, 95 (2), June, 331-44

  4. Mark A. Cohen (1991), 'Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's “Unconstitutional” about the Sentencing Commission?', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 183-99

  5. Daniel Klerman (1999), 'Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence', Southern California Law Review, 72, 455-63

  6. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati and Eric A. Posner (2009), 'Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate', Journal of Legal Analysis, 1 (1), Winter, 47-117

  7. Thomas J. Miceli and Metin M. Cosgel (1994), 'Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making', Journal of Economic Bahavior and Organization, 23 (1), January, 31

  8. Richard A. Posner (2005), 'Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach', Florida State University Law Review, 32, 1259-79

  9. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig and Michael E. Solimine (1998), 'Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges', Journal of Legal Studies, XXVII (1), January, 271-33

  10. Gilat Levy (2005), 'Careerist Judges and the Appeals Process', RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2), Summer, 275-97

  11. James F. Spriggs, II and Paul J. Wahlbeck (1995), 'Calling It Quits: Strategic Retirement on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1893-1991', Political Research Quarterly, 48 (3), September, 573-97

Judicial Independence and Dependence

  1. Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches and Andrei Shleifer (2004), 'Judicial Checks and Balances', Journal of Political Economy, 112 (2), 445-70

  2. Daniel M. Klerman and Paul G. Mahoney (2005), 'The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from Eighteenth Century England', American Law and Economics Review, 7 (1), Spring, 1-27

  3. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1975), 'The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective', Journal of Law and Economics, XVIII (1), April, 875-901

  4. John Ferejohn (1999), 'Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence', Southern California Law Review, 72, 353-84

  5. Melinda Gann Hall (1992), 'Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts', Journal of Politics, 54 (2), May, 427-46

  6. Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland (1999), 'Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards', Journal of Law and Economics, XLII (1), April, 157-88

  7. Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon (2004), 'Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when It Runs for Office?', American Journal of Political Science, 48 (2), April, 247-63

Opinions and Precedent

  1. Jeffrey K. Staton and Georg Vanberg (2008) 'The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions', American Journal of Political Science, 52 (3), July, 504-19

  2. Michael Abramowicz and Emerson H. Tiller (2009), 'Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial Decision Making', Journal of Legal Studies, 38 (2), June, 419-43

  3. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1980), 'Legal Change, Judicial Behavior, and the Diversity Jurisdiction', Journal of Legal Studies, 9 (2), March, 367-86

  4. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (2011), 'Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis', Journal of Legal Analysis, 3 (1), Spring, 101-37

  5. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Wendy L. Martinek (2004), 'Comparing Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals', American Journal of Political Science, 48 (1), January, 123-37

  6. Eric Rasmusen (1994), 'Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 10 (1), April, 63-83

  7. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1976), 'Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis', Journal of Law and Economics, XIX (1), April, 249-307

  8. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1992), 'Modeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1), March, 169-85

  9. Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth (1996), 'The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (4), November, 971-1003

  10. Jack Knight and Lee Epstein (1996), 'The Norm of Stare Decisis', American Journal of Political Science, 40 (4), November, 1018-35

  11. Lewis A. Kornhauser (1995), 'Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System', Southern California Law Review, 68 (4), May, 1605-29

  12. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson (2002), 'Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication', American Political Science Review, 96 (4), December, 755-66

  13. Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi (2006), 'Judicial Precedents in Civil Law Systems: A Dynamic Analysis', International Review of Law and Economics , 26 (4), December, 519-35

  14. McNollgast (1995), 'Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law', Southern California Law Review, 68 (5), July, 1631-83

  15. Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer (2007), 'Overruling and the Instability of Law', Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2), June, 309-28

Collegial Courts

  1. Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn (1999), 'Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (3), October, 549-72

  2. David W. Rohde (1972), 'Policy Goals, Strategic Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in the U.S. Supreme Court', Midwest Journal of Political Science, XVI, 652-82

  3. Jeffrey R. Lax and Charles M. Cameron (2007), 'Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US Supreme Court', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (2), June, 276-302

  4. Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs and Forrest Maltzman (1998), 'Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court', American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1), January, 294-315

  5. Chris W. Bonneau, Thomas H. Hammond, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J. Wahlbeck (2007), 'Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court', American Journal of Political Science, 51 (4), October, 890-905

  6. Jeffrey R. Lax (2007), 'Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts', American Political Science Review, 101 (3), August, 591-604

  7. Frank H. Easterbrook (1982), 'Ways of Criticizing the Court', Harvard Law Review, 95 (4), February, 802-32

  8. Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager (1986), 'Unpacking the Court', Yale Law Journal, 96 (1), November, 82-117

  9. Robert Anderson IV and Alexander M. Tahk (2007), 'Institutions and Equilibrium in the United States Supreme Court', American Political Science Review, 101 (4), November, 811-25

  10. Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller (1998), 'Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal', Yale Law Journal, 107 (7), May, 2155-76

  11. Sean Farhang and Gregory Wawro (2004), 'Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 20 (2), October, 299-330

  12. Jonathan P. Kastellec (2007), 'Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23 (2), June, 421-41

The Hierarchy of Justice

  1. Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn (1999), 'Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15 (3), October, 549-72

  2. Jeffrey R. Lax (2003), 'Certiorari and Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy: Discretion, Reputation and the Rule of Four', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (1), 61-86

  3. Charles M. Cameron, Jeffrey A. Segal and Donald Songer (2000), 'Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions', American Political Science Review, 94 (1), March, 101-16

  4. Tracey E. George and Michael E. Solimine (2001), 'Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc', Supreme Court Economic Review, 9, 171-204

  5. Tom S. Clark (2009), 'A Principal-Agent Theory of En Banc Review', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 25 (1), May, 55-79

  6. Linda R. Cohen and Matthew L. Spitzer (1994), 'Solving the Chevron Puzzle', Law and Contemporary Problems, 57 (1 and 2), Winter and Spring, 65-110

  7. Matt Spitzer and Eric Talley (2000), 'Judicial Auditing', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIX (2), Part 1, June, 649-83

  8. Steven Shavell, (1995), 'The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction', Journal of Legal Studies, XXIV (2), June, 379-426

  9. Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron and Scott Comparato (2010), 'Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals', American Journal of Political Science, 54 (4), October, 891-905

  10. Walter F. Murphy (1959), 'Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power', American Political Science Review, LIII (4), December, 1017-31

Executives and Legislatures

  1. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller (1990), 'A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the “State Farm” and “Grove City Cases”', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 (2), Autumn, 263-300

  2. William N. Eskridge, Jr. (1991), 'Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions', Yale Law Journal, 101 (2), November, 331-455

  3. John A. Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast (1992), 'A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation', International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (2), June, 263-79

  4. Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland and Stefanie A. Lindquist (2011), 'Congress, the Supreme Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model', American Journal of Political Science, 55 (1), January, 89-104

  5. Tom S. Clark (2009), 'The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy', American Journal of Political Science, 53 (4), October, 971-89

  6. Gretchen Helmke (2002), 'The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy', American Political Science Review, 96 (2), June, 291-303

  7. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight and Olga Shvetsova (2001), 'The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government', Law and Society Review, 35 (1), 117-63

  8. Georg Vanberg (2001), 'Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review', American Journal of Political Science, 45 (2), April, 346-61

  9. James R. Rogers (2001), 'Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction', American Political Science Review, 45 (1), January, 84-99

  10. Joseph L. Smith and Emerson H. Tiller (2002), 'The Strategy of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law', Journal of Legal Studies, XXXI (1), Part 1, January, 61-82

  11. William H. Riker and Barry R. Weingast (1988), 'Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures', Virginia